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Abstract Theories on network governance constitute a promising approach to a better
understanding of complex decision-making and problem-solving. Network theories are
increasingly used in housing research. In this paper we present case-study findings on
urban regeneration decision-making in Groningen, a medium-sized city in the North of
the Netherlands. We used a network governance approach as an analytical framework.
Social landlords and local government in Groningen have been collaborating in urban
regeneration processes for many years. In 2006 negotiations between these actors on a
renewal of the Local Urban Regeneration Covenant ran into difficulties and encountered
seemingly insurmountable differences of opinion. These difficulties were largely caused
by the increased complexity of the decision-making process, the large number of actors
involved and a shift in focus from ‘bricks-and-mortar’ investments to a more balanced
approach including social and economic aspects of urban regeneration. In this paper we
analyse decision-making on urban regeneration policy in Groningen over the past
10 years. The outcomes of the case study demonstrate the usefulness of the network
approach as a framework to analyse decision-making processes. The paper also identifies
strategies used by actors in the field to successfully deal with complexities and uncer-
tainties in networks.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Understanding and influencing complex regeneration decision-making
Urban renewal policies are generally laid down in area action plans, master plans or covenants.
The development of these plans involves many government, market, third-sector and com-
munity actors. Due to its complexity these decision-making processes often end up in deadlock
or exclude weak actors like residents (Swyngedouw 2005). Network governance theorists have
developed frameworks that claim to increase our understanding of these processes and provide
instruments to cope with the complexity of contemporary public-sector decision-making
(Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). In this article we put the network governance framework to the
test by analysing resent urban regeneration decision-making processes in Groningen (The
Netherlands) concerning the renewal of the Local Urban Regeneration Covenant.
In Sect. 2 we introduce the network governance approach and discuss important
characteristics of networks such as pluriformity, closedness, interdependency and
dynamics. We investigate the uncertainties connected with problem-solving and decision-
making in complex networks and offer possible solutions for handling complexity and
uncertainty. We continue in Sect. 3 with a summary of shifts in governance in urban
renewal and affordable housing provision. Starting on a European level, we subsequently
summarize the institutional context of the social housing sector in the Netherlands and
continue by describing the urban renewal network in Groningen. In Sect. 4 the decision-
making dynamics in Groningen are analysed using network governance concepts. We
conclude this paper by discussing the usefulness of the network approach as an analytical
framework and as a toolbox to be used by practitioners in the field.
1.2 Research design
This article presents preliminary results from an ongoing doctoral research project that
explores the shifts in housing governance and will focus on the role and position of social
landlords in urban decision-making processes in England and the Netherlands. Data for this
article was gathered by conducting 25 interviews with key informants from housing
associations and the Groningen local authority. The interviews were conducted by the
author in collaboration with two City Council officials in preparation of a policy confer-
ence to renew the local area agreement, the Local Urban Renewal Covenant.
The interviewees included three aldermen as well as the development, planning and
finance managers from the housing associations that were involved in urban renewal and
their counterparts within the Groningen City Council. The interviews were structured
around three types of network uncertainty as identified by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004), i.e.
substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainties. We will discuss these uncertainties in
greater detail in Sect. 2.4. The following topics were raised during the interviews:
1. Strategies and ambitions of the own organization;
2. Evaluation of past decision-making processes;
3. Possible efficiency gains in ‘bricks-and-mortar’ investments;
4. Social investments issues;
5. The coordination and management of urban regeneration interventions.
In addition to interview data, the findings presented in this paper are based on desk
research involving policy documents and meeting notes and the participant observation of
a high-level policy conference.
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The interviewees did not include any residents’ representatives because the latter did
not participate in the policy conference that constitutes an important focal point in this
article. In a later phase however, residents were involved in public consultation on the
results of the negotiations between the City Council and the housing associations.
The author had exceptional access to urban renewal decision-making in Groningen. This
was because of his 8 years of experience as a practitioner working for a housing associ-
ation in Groningen from 1996 to 2004 and in 2006 as an external facilitator at a crucial
stage in decision-making concerning the renewal of the Local Urban Renewal Covenant.
The danger of researcher bias due to this intimate connection with actors in the Groningen
urban renewal network is limited, however. This researcher has no formal connections with
actors in Groningen and no stake in the outcomes of decision-making processes. In
addition we will use other independent external assessments of urban renewal decision-
making in Groningen and the level of resident participation in the concluding section of
this article (Van Hulst et al. 2008; Van de Wijdeven and De Graaf 2008).
2 Understanding governance networks
2.1 Network theory
In this paper we use a network governance approach to increase our understanding of
complex decision-making in Groningen. Mullins and Rhodes (2007) identify several
strands of network/systems theory in the field of housing research. They distinguished the
following key strands of network concepts: (1) policy networks (2) network governance (3)
supply networks/chains (4) organizational fields and (5) complex systems. Mullins and
Rhodes synthesized these strands of network analysis into five overarching themes and
interests:
1. a common emphasis on the way in which relationships between organizations affect
the behaviour of individual organizations;
2. a recognition that the shape and structure of the network in which organizations
operate can have significant implications for decision-making;
3. an interest in the way in which policy interventions are and should be structured in
governance networks;
4. a shared interest in the way in which organizations adapt to changes in their
environment and seek to influence these changes;
5. an interest in the boundaries of networks and the different levels of decision-making
that influence what happens in networks.
We have chosen to use the network governance strand to increase our understanding of
decision-making processes because this approach specifically targets the relations between
interdependent actors and the interactions that result from decision-making processes
in situations where there is no dominant actor (see De Bruijn et al. 2002; Kickert et al.
1997; Klijn et al. 1995; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Klijn and Koppenjan 2007; Sørensen
and Torfing 2007).
2.2 How governance networks work
The process of network formation is driven by interdependencies that induce actors to
negotiate with others to attain the resources needed to achieve their goals. Their
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interactions lead to the formation of rules that are sustained by and changed through these
interactions (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). These interactions create relationship patterns
that over time acquire more robustness. Relationship patterns create formal and informal
rules for future interactions. And it is these rules and patterns of interaction that constitute a
‘network’.
Koppenjan and Klijn describe series of interactions as ‘policy games’. The actors’
resources and their strategic behaviour determine their position in the network. Actors do
not select strategies at random but are guided by their own objectives and perceptions, their
own stakes in the outcome and the strategies of other participants. Policy games take place
in activated parts of a network called ‘arenas’. A game may consist of multiple arenas and
game rounds. Each round is concluded by a crucial decision or event, for example the
signing of a covenant or—in a less positive sense—a major conflict. The developments and
outcomes of decision-making are influenced by the strategies the actors use. These strat-
egies can lead to breakthroughs but also to blockages and deadlocks in the decision-making
process.
2.3 Characteristics of complex networks
De Bruijn et al. (2002) identify four characteristics of networks that have a major influence
on the level of complexity and the nature of decision-making processes. We will give a
short overview of these characteristics and illustrate them with examples from the Gron-
ingen case. The four characteristics are:
(a) Pluriformity;
(b) Closedness;
(c) Interdependency;
(d) Dynamics.
2.3.1 Pluriformity
The level of pluriformity is reflected in the number of actors involved in the governance
network and their organizational characteristics. Furthermore, pluriformity is influenced by
the variety of goals and perceptions of network actors. In Groningen the number of social
landlords involved in urban renewal projects is limited. Due to mergers this number
decreased from nine in the 1980s to only five in 2008. In addition, few local authority
departments are involved in the bricks-and-mortar urban renewal, and Groningen has no
devolved municipal structure. In comparison, Amsterdam has 14 housing associations and
five borough authorities with devolved housing policy responsibilities. However, as we
will discuss later in this paper, the number of actors involved in urban renewal decision-
making in Groningen has increased considerably due to the inclusion of more social
objectives in urban regeneration policy.
Groningen has a long tradition (since the 1970s) in developing mutual urban renewal
goals. These have been formalized in local area agreements between housing associations
and the local authority, thereby limiting the level of pluriformity in goals and perceptions.
In addition social landlords and the Groningen City Council are used to jointly commis-
sioning housing market research. They have established an organizational structure to
coordinate urban renewal decision-making and implementation, thereby further decreasing
pluriformity.
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2.3.2 Interdependency
Interdependencies in a network originate from the fragmentation of resources among
actors. Actors need these resources to attain their own goals. Therefore they often need to
collaborate with other actors. The resources range from financial grants, loans, building
locations, building permits and public endorsement of plans to democratic anchorage by
the city council. For example, housing associations in the Netherlands are often strongly
dependent upon local authorities to provide building locations. Municipalities, on the other
hand, need social landlords as delivery vehicles for new affordable homes and urban
regeneration. This is especially the case for the development of new affordable housing, as
each municipality has a limited number of housing associations active in its territory.
An additional form of interdependency was introduced in Groningen by the recent shift
from bricks-and-mortar investments towards an approach balancing the social and physical
investments. This resulted in an increased emphasis on initiatives aimed at social targets
like crime prevention, supporting multi-problem families, creating opportunities for the
long-term unemployed and tackling the school dropout problem.
2.3.3 Closedness
A third element of complex decision-making is closedness. Actors in a network are not
automatically sensitive to external steering interventions by the state or other government
agencies. National and local governments are no longer dominant actors that can coerce
other actors to implement government policy. This is illustrated by the inability of the
Dutch housing minister in the 1990s to increase the number of social rental homes being
sold. The central government’s goal was ignored by most housing associations (Van Bortel
and Elsinga 2007).
De Bruijn et al. (2002) argue that organizations need a certain degree of closedness,
because receptiveness to all external signals would send them adrift without a fixed aim or
objective. Closedness enables organizations to retain their focus and incorporate only a
limited amount of the complexity and environmental turbulence into their activities.
Closedness is often the result of the power and autonomy of the actor(s) involved.
Autonomous actors do not usually need the resources offered by other actors and can
subsequently simply ignore their initiatives.
Closedness can also be found in Groningen. It is known that actors (housing associa-
tions and local authorities) are used to working towards mutually supported urban renewal
policies and that they jointly commission housing market research. However, the inter-
views with municipal representatives suggest that housing associations were not really
inclined to listen to the local government’s plea to financially support social investments
until they identified this as a source of leverage to advocate their wish for more efficient
project development procedures.
The difficulty of accessing decision-making arenas is another form of closedness that
was very prominent in Groningen. Local authorities and housing associations worked very
closely together in the development of an urban regeneration strategy. Important decisions
were discussed and agreed upon before they involved other actors. De Kam (2004) argues
that the intensive relations between the local authority and housing associations resulted in
formidable entry barriers for outsiders like commercial real estate developers or non-local
housing associations. Entry of outsiders could be interpreted as a sign that local actors were
not able to solve the problems on their own. However, this closedness was not limited to
outsiders. The close collaboration between city administrators and social landlords also
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made it difficult for citizens to influence urban renewal policy (De Kam 2004). In addition
Edelenbos (2004) concluded that there was little attention for the role and position of
elected council members in the political debate on urban renewal policy. To summarize,
the role of the professionals was very dominant.
2.3.4 Dynamics
Networks are constantly in transition due to changes in the closedness, interdependency and
pluriformity of actors in the network and due to contextual developments. The network
landscape changes, some actors leave, others join in, rules can change and so can the distri-
bution of resources. This means that opportunities and barriers for successfully influencing
decision-making can change over time. Decision-making in networks is therefore often
unpredictable. Due to the absence of a hierarchical structure, every actor can try to influence the
agenda-setting and decision-making process. In a complex network this is not an easy process.
Fragmented interdependencies can make it necessary to interact with many different actors to
influence outcomes. Furthermore in complex networks there are often no ‘done deals’. New
actors in the network, new decision-making rounds or altered network characteristics can lead
to the re-evaluation of decisions made in the past, with possibly different outcomes.
The concept of network dynamics can be illustrated by the shift from the bricks-and-
mortar approach in Groningen towards a process balancing social and economic investments.
Due to this shift many new actors from the social sector joined in the decision-making game.
We can illustrate this by applying Koppenjan and Klijn’s (2004) network concepts to the
Groningen case. Figure 1 shows two decision-making games. The first policy game
addresses the bricks-and-mortar pillar of urban regeneration. The second game depicted in
Fig. 1 is concerned with social investments. Social investments are not new, but investments
in health, education, crime prevention and unemployment programmes have only recently
been seen as important elements in urban regeneration in the Netherlands (VROM 2007).
This new vision has resulted in the interconnecting of both decision-making games.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, a new policy arena has emerged connecting the bricks-and-
mortar and the social investments games. Both games take place in different networks with
dissimilar rules, values and vocabulary. These differences can (and did) cause problems
and sometimes irritation. For example, informants from the bricks-and-mortar network
mention the lack of neighbourhood orientation among the actors involved in social
investments as a problem. Actors from the social investments network are blamed for
rarely participating in urban regeneration meetings and activities on a neighbourhood level.
Another point of criticism levelled at actors from the social investments network is their
singular focus on long-term programmes and specific target groups, like immigrant women
or school dropouts. Actors from the bricks-and-mortar network appear to prefer a more
geographically demarcated and short-term approach.
Adapted from Koppenjan and Klijn 2004. Comments on bricks-and-mortar and social
investments added by author.
2.4 Uncertainties in networks
After discussing the characteristics of complex networks described by De Bruijn et al.
(2002), we shall delve deeper into the network approach as a useful tool for getting a better
understanding of complex decision-making processes. An important factor influencing
these processes is uncertainty. Decision-making in complex networks has to deal with
several forms of uncertainty (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004):
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– Substantive uncertainty;
– Strategic uncertainty;
– Institutional uncertainty.
We will illustrate how these uncertainties played out in Groningen. As we discussed
earlier in this paper, the aim of the Groningen City Council to seek additional funding for
social investments connected very well with the wish of housing associations to organize
the development of new homes in urban renewal areas more efficiently. By connecting
both objectives, both actors wanted to ‘increase the size of the pie’ by reinvesting project
development efficiency gains in the social projects. This initiative, however, created new
substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainties.
2.4.1 Substantive uncertainty
Substantive uncertainty is connected with the lack of shared knowledge about the nature of
complex problems and viable solutions. Actors can have different problem perceptions and
dissimilar frames of reference because they can interpret available information very dif-
ferently. Adding more information is not always a solution because it can increase, instead
of diminish, substantive uncertainty. New information brought forward by one actor is
often debated or simply ignored by other actors. In Groningen actors have a long tradition
Fig. 1 Connection between the ‘bricks-and-mortar’ and ‘social investments’ games. Adapted from
Koppenjan and Klijn 2004. Comments on bricks-and-mortar and social investments added by author
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in jointly commissioning research in housing market developments. This situation can limit
substantive uncertainty because knowledge is based on a shared frame of reference.
2.4.2 Strategic uncertainty
Actors involved in decision-making can have different objectives. They may base their
actions on perceptions of reality that are not acknowledged or are unknown to other
participants. This increases the strategic uncertainty. Furthermore, actors respond to and
anticipate each other’s strategic moves. Altogether, this can lead to large variety of
strategies and a high level of unpredictability in the decision-making process, thereby
creating strategic uncertainties.
In Groningen strategic uncertainties arose from the mix of physical and social urban
regeneration investments. This mix was new and created uncertainties about the different
responsibilities of the actors involved. Strategic uncertainty was further increased by the
intention of housing associations to not only financially contribute to social investments
but also to control and monitor these investments. Many City Council officials regarded the
social investments as their prerogative, even if these investments were partly funded by
housing associations.
2.4.3 Institutional uncertainty
Complex decision-making often involves large numbers of actors. These actors frequently
come from different institutional backgrounds, bringing with them their own culture and
values. Complex problems often cut across existing organizational and institutional
boundaries, administrative levels and networks. Interaction in policy games and the out-
comes of these games are therefore influenced by different and sometimes conflicting rules,
vocabulary/jargon and values. Actors often trust each other, but interactions can also be
guided by high levels of distrust.
One of the reasons for institutional uncertainty in Groningen arose from the differing
opinions about the way efficiency gains from urban renewal projects should be allocated to
social investments. Should there be a central ‘till’ from which all social projects should be
funded? And if so, who should control this till? Most City Council officials preferred this
idea, whereby the local authority would be managing the till. Housing associations sup-
ported an option whereby funds would flow directly from the social landlord into the social
investment projects.
The three forms of uncertainty distinguished in the Groningen case are interconnected.
The institutional uncertainty about the way efficiency gains should be allocated to social
investments was strongly influenced by the strategic uncertainty about the responsibilities
of housing association and the Groningen City Council.
3 Developments in social housing governance
3.1 European developments
Throughout Europe, central governments are increasingly withdrawing from social housing
provision. They are shifting tasks and responsibilities to lower levels of government or
non-governmental organizations (UNECE 2006; Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). There is
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an overall trend towards devolution, decentralization and privatization. This trend was
partly triggered by beliefs prevailing in the eighties concerning the role of the state in
housing provision. In most countries this resulted in a reduction in public housing
expenditure. In general, housing became more market-oriented, competitive and open to
economic pressures (Priemus et al. 1993; Priemus 2004). Overall, the central government
is still an important party in housing systems, but a shift in orientation can be seen from a
‘providing state’ to an ‘enabling state’ (Doherty 2004, p. 256). These developments have
changed the decision-making processes; the overall trend is towards an increasing number
of actors and a fragmentation of power and resources. These developments are not natural
phenomena. They are caused by the economic, social and political developments that
triggered changes in public administration, like the rise of New Public Management
approaches (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).
In addition to this, in many European countries other developments can be identified.
There is a trend for housing associations to bring their physical and spatial investments (the
traditional bricks-and-mortar approach) more in balance with the economic and social
aspects of urban renewal. This is illustrated by the iN Business for Neighbourhoods ini-
tiative by housing associations in England and the ‘Answer to Society’ by the Dutch
housing associations in 2007 (Aedes 2007). In both countries, housing associations commit
themselves to invest in local communities.
Furthermore, an increased emphasis is put on resident empowerment, participative
decision-making and public accountability. This is illustrated in England by the ‘Every
tenant matters’ review (Cave 2007) and the subsequent ‘tenant-based’ reform of the
regulation of housing associations. In the Netherlands the ‘Confidence in the Neighbour-
hood’ report published by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR
2005) triggered a trend towards more resident involvement in urban renewal. The city of
Groningen is one of four local authorities forming a front-runner group of municipalities
that want to give residents a central position in urban renewal decision-making based on
the ‘Confidence in the Neighbourhood’ philosophy.
3.2 Developments in the Netherlands
3.2.1 The Dutch social housing sector in an international perspective
In many European countries governments are decreasing state funding and state involve-
ment in the provision of social housing and giving a greater role to private and third-sector
organizations. Developments in the Netherlands are no exception, although in some
respects the Dutch case is unique. The Dutch social rented sector covers 35% of the total
housing stock. This substantial market share is remarkable in an international perspective,
as the UK takes second place with 20% of the stock. In most European countries the social
rented sector accounts for less than 10% of the housing stock (Whitehead and Scanlon
2007).
The (almost non-existent) financial relationship between the government and social
landlords is another remarkable feature of the Dutch housing system. In most countries
social housing associations can still count on government subsidies for the construction of
housing (Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). The Netherlands is the only country that has
almost totally abolished subsidies in the social rented sector. In an extensive ‘grossing and
balancing operation’ during the 1990s, all outstanding government loans to housing
associations were netted against supply-side housing subsidy obligations of the Dutch state.
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3.2.2 From independence to semi-government organizations and back again
The social housing sector in the Netherlands has undergone numerous changes since it first
came into being around 1860 and since the introduction of the Housing Act in 1901.
Housing associations were private organizations that were subject to varying degrees of
government influence during the twentieth century. After World War II the social housing
sector became a crucial instrument in the battle against housing shortages. From 1945 until
1990, the Dutch government remained closely involved in the operations and funding of
housing associations. As a result housing associations gradually turned into semi-public
institutions that had strong hierarchical ties with the government. The grossing and bal-
ancing operation fundamentally changed the relations between government and Dutch
housing associations, giving the latter a virtually autonomous position.
Though fully independent financially and administratively since the 1990 s, housing
associations in the Netherlands still require authorization for high-impact decisions.
Under the terms of the Housing Act their responsibilities and operating conditions are
laid down in the Social Rented Sector Management Order (abbreviated BBSH in Dutch).
The BBSH stipulates that housing associations are responsible for providing good,
affordable housing for people who are unable to pay market prices. The BBSH is not
very specific about the results expected from housing associations, and it leaves this
point to be negotiated between local authorities and housing associations (Van Bortel and
Elsinga 2007).
3.3 Developments in Groningen
To understand the interactions between parties in the urban renewal network of Groningen
it is essential to get some grasp of the rather atypical nature of this city. Groningen is
located in the extreme North of the Netherlands and in its immediate vicinity there are no
other cities of consequence. The local authorities of Groningen adopted the slogan
‘Nothing goes above Groningen’ to accentuate its Northern location, the assets of the city
and the high level of self-confidence shared by its residents. The location of Groningen has
some drawbacks, however. The economic situation, although improving in recent years, is
less prosperous compared with the Western part of the country; unemployment rates are
higher and incomes lower. This situation is reflected in the housing market and housing
stock. Compared with the West, buying a house in Groningen is relatively affordable.
Waiting lists for social housing are relatively short (but for those in dire need of a home
still too long).
The market position of the social housing stock in Groningen is vulnerable, as was
illustrated by the high levels of housing voids at the end of the 1990s. This market situation
stimulated actors in Groningen earlier than those in other Dutch cities to develop large
scale-urban renewal programmes. Actors in Groningen have a long tradition of close
collaboration in urban regeneration. Since the 1970s, the local authority, housing associ-
ations, residents, police, schools and other organizations have worked closely together to
improve housing and living conditions in the city. The grossing and balancing operation in
the 1990s was not the start of network governance of urban renewal in Groningen. It did
however, give housing associations a more powerful and autonomous position vis-a`-vis the
local authority. Before this operation the local authority was not inclined to involve
housing associations in the strategic decisions about urban renewal policy, like the
selection of intervention areas (De Kam 2004).
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4 Decision-making dynamics in the Groningen urban regeneration network
In this section we shall describe the process of decision-making on urban regeneration
policy in Groningen using the network approach discussed earlier. In Groningen we can
broadly distinguish three periods or policy games:
(a) Period 1: 1995–1998;
(b) Period 2: 1998–2005;
(c) Period 3: 2005–2007.
These periods have been distinguished by the author. The demarcation is open to
discussion and is not an objective empirical fact. However, each period is marked by an
important event such as signing off on a covenant between actors. In the following we will
discuss these periods in some detail, especially regarding the more recent developments in
the period 2005–2007. At the end of each period, there was a significant increase or
decrease in the level of uncertainty. This is in line with Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) notion
of ‘game rounds’ that are most often concluded with breakthroughs or deadlocks.
4.1 Period 1: 1995–1998
The period starting in the mid-1990s and lasting until 1998 was characterized in Groningen
by deteriorating market conditions, rising vacancies and increasing social problems in
several neighbourhoods. Housing market surveys predicted mayor redundancies of apart-
ment blocks. This resulted in a strong feeling among most housing associations and the
local authority that urgent action was necessary. Groningen was one of the first cities in the
Netherlands where in 1998 housing associations and the municipality agreed on large-scale
urban regeneration investments, spanning a period of 12 years. The end of this period is
demarcated by the signing of the first Local Urban Renewal Covenant in 1998.
4.2 Period 2: 1998–2005
In the period 1998–2005 implementation of the 1998 covenant was at the centre of
attention. In this period it became clear that residents did not always share the ambitions of
the Groningen housing associations and the local authorities. They did not agree with the
large number of redevelopment plans. Residents were particularly opposed to the large
proportion of demolish-and-rebuild in the redevelopment plans, because inadequate
guarantees were given to residents that affordable houses would be available in their old
neighbourhood. New dwellings were mainly intended for middle- and high-income
households, while many of the incumbent tenants were dependent on affordable housing.
Market developments also proved less gloomy than depicted in housing market surveys
conducted at the end of the 1990s. Tensions on the housing market remained and waiting
lists were still long for those seeking a new home. It also turned out to be difficult to deliver
as many housing demolitions and new-build homes as envisioned in the 1998 Local Urban
Renewal Covenant. In 2002 these developments led to a revised Local Urban Renewal
Covenant [‘Het Lokaal Akkoord’] between housing associations and the municipality. In
this new agreement demolition targets were adjusted downwards and the focus shifted from
quantitative bricks-and-mortar targets towards more qualitative and integrative objectives.
The latter focus placed more emphasis on the built environment and living conditions of
residents and less on transformation of the housing stock alone (Van der Wal 2004). This
shift towards a more balanced approach to urban regeneration was illustrated by the
Network governance in action 177
123
selection of several new ‘Social Urban Regeneration Areas’ in Groningen. These areas
would receive an extensive social programme targeting crime, vandalism and anti-social
behaviour and only a small proportion of bricks-and-mortar investments.
The 1998–2005 period is demarcated by the ‘Nieuw Cement’ [New Mortar] exhibition
presenting an overview of urban regeneration results in Groningen from 1998 until 2004.
Housing associations and the municipality jointly organized this event. The publication
accompanying the exhibition contained several essays written by relative outsiders (De Kam
2004; Edelenbos 2004; Ouwehand 2004) that contained—sometimes critical—reflections on
the process and outcomes of urban regeneration in Groningen. Critical comments were made
about the lack of genuine involvement of residents and elected politicians.
4.3 Period 3: 2005–2007
In 2005 the municipality and housing associations started discussions on renewal of the 2002
Local Urban Regeneration Covenant. The emphasis on social investments made these dis-
cussions different from those on the earlier covenants. In 2005 a dormant discontent among
professionals on the dominance of housing associations and the municipality was inflamed by
the publication ‘Confidence in the Neighbourhood’ [‘Vertrouwen in de buurt’] by the Dutch
Scientific Council for Government Policy (abbreviated WWR in Dutch). This publication
advocated stronger resident participation in improving the living conditions in neighbourhoods
and powerful interventions by local governments and others if neighbourhoods lacked the
social fibre to deal with problems themselves. Citizens’ empowerment was a central theme in
the ‘Confidence in the Neighbourhood’ report. The report mentions housing associations as
organizations with the organizational strength and financial resources to take the lead in
neighbourhood renewal operations, including coordinating activities targeting social problems.
In Groningen the ‘Confidence in the Neighbourhood’ (WRR 2005) report inspired many
of the professionals participating in urban regeneration projects to apply a more bottom-up
approach. In the spring of 2006 a special conference was held in Groningen to discuss the
implications of the report. Pieter Winsemius, lead author of the report and former Minister
of Housing and Spatial Planning attended the conference together with more than 100
representatives of housing associations, local authorities, police, schools, residents and
welfare organizations. The conference resulted in the formulation of ‘Ten golden rules of
urban regeneration’ (Frenay 2006) (Table 1). These rules turned out to be very influential
in subsequent discussions on renewal of the Local Urban Regeneration Covenant.
Table 1 The ten golden rules of urban regeneration in Groningen
1. Develop tailor-made approaches for each neighbourhood
2. Create clear roles and responsibilities
3. Give residents breathing space, do not micro-manage
4. Keep it simple
5. Act more and talk less
6. Interact
7. Celebrate successes
8. Keep pace
9. Have confidence, give confidence
10. Nurture a ‘can do’ attitude
Source: Frenay 2006
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The wide dissemination of the ‘Confidence in the Neighbourhood’ philosophy could be
interpreted as the success story of a well-written report sponsored by a charismatic political
figure. Although not underpinned by research, the success of this report could also be
interpreted from a ‘governing without government’ perspective. In that light, its success
could also be the result of a brilliant government strategy aimed at changing the rules of
decision-making in urban renewal processes through publishing a report by an independent
(but state-funded) scientific council that fits the government agenda.
4.4 Connecting games for social and bricks-and-mortar investments
The emphasis on the empowerment of residents coincided with a growing notion within the
local administration of Groningen that they were unable to fund the social activities needed
to tackle problems in the no less than 14 regeneration neighbourhoods in Groningen. The
Groningen City Council calculated the amount needed for these social services and con-
cluded that the available municipal funds were insufficient. Instead of lowering their
ambitions the local authority asked the local housing associations for assistance. This
illustrates that dependencies are closely linked with the goals and ambitions of actors. The
City Council could have chosen to lower its ambitions, resulting in a lower investment cost
that matched the municipal budget.
In subsequent negations housing associations and the municipality developed solutions
entwining the goals of both parties: making bricks-and-mortar urban regeneration more
efficient by reducing the red tape and streamlining planning procedures and then rein-
vesting these efficiency gains in social activities.
Actors developed a new model for project development: the Relay Race Model (in
Dutch ‘het estafettemodel’). Actors were confident that the Relay Race Model could
shorten the time needed to develop urban renewal projects by 40% (from 4 years to
2.5 years) by organizing the process in a more effective way. Changes included the clear
identification of steps in the process and defining clear responsibilities, timelines and
output criteria for each step. The parties were confident that this would lead to substantial
cost reductions, on average 7,000€ for each new-built dwelling. Housing associations were
prepared to use these efficiency gains to fund social investments. But housing associations
also wanted guarantees that these funds were used effectively. Some associations were
only prepared to sponsor activities in neighbourhoods where their own housing stock was
located. What made decision-making difficult was the combination of two different net-
works: the bricks-and-mortar network and the network dealing with social investments (see
Fig. 1 above).
4.5 Creating a way out of deadlock
In the autumn of 2006 negotiations on the New Local Performance Agreement reached a
critical phase. At that moment decision-making was in a deadlock due to disagreement
between the local authority and housing associations about the way funds from bricks-and-
mortar projects would be made available for social investments. After 2 years of prepa-
ration and negotiations, the renewal of the Local Urban Regeneration Covenant seemed
more dead than alive.
From a network perspective, the complexity of the governance network on urban
renewal issues had reached a critical level. There were too many actors and issues. As one
Groningen City Council informant phrased it, ‘there were too many pieces on the chess-
board.’ In addition the frequent and informal contacts between actors hampered decision-
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making by creating a high level of ‘noise’, hearsay, confusion, mistrust and miscommu-
nication. Quoting another informant from the Groningen City Council:
Groningen is a small place, people bump into each other all the time; during a
football game or in the shopping mall. It’s impossible to coordinate or manage these
interactions in any way, especially because a lot of talk is going on about the people
involved and not on the issues at hand.
The CEOs of the two largest housing associations and the administrator of the municipal
department of housing and spatial planning decided on a ‘pressure-cooker approach’. This
entailed holding a two-day conference at a secluded location bringing together all relevant
issues and actors from different hierarchical levels.
In interviews preceding the conference, high-level officials expressed trust in the other
parties and emphasized that housing associations and the municipality needed each other.
However, informants on lower hierarchical levels articulated less trust and confidence. One
housing association’s informant stated that:
the local authority needs money from housing associations to fund their social
investments ambitions. The city council sees the promise to increase the efficiency of
the building production as a possibility to get that money, but the city council is not
really committed to implementing measures to increase efficiency and it will never
be implemented.
A Groningen city administration official felt that housing associations were making the
discussion unnecessarily complicated:
housing associations are clever, they have more money than we think. They have
made profits due to investments of the local authority. Their financial contribution to
the social investment program is peanuts.
Another finding from the interviews was a deeply felt reservation amongst represen-
tatives from both housing associations and several municipal departments about the limited
organizational capacity of actors in the social investment network to deliver the necessary
results.
Information from the interviews was processed in a discussion paper and a detailed
programme for the conference. The setting of the policy conference was kept inten-
tionally informal. It was held at a secluded location with many possibilities for
interaction in alternating plenary sessions, subgroups and social activities. An overnight
stay was compulsory for all participants. To enhance the ‘pressure-cooker’ effect, the
conference programme was structured in such a way that the results (or lack thereof) had
to be presented at the end of conference at a session with the three local aldermen in
attendance.
Parallel to the plenary and subgroup meetings a draft policy document was written
describing the main points of agreement and disagreement. This draft was discussed with
participants and adjusted to include their comments. At the end of the two-day confer-
ence a policy document was drafted and agreed upon by all participants. In the weeks
following the conference this document was developed into a draft New Urban
Regeneration Covenant. Early in 2007 the draft covenant was made public for consul-
tation with residents.
Paramount in the New Urban Regeneration Covenant is the balance between
investments in bricks-and-mortar and social activities. The joint responsibility of the
local authority and housing associations to secure good living conditions in
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neighbourhoods is firmly anchored in the Covenant, specifying activities like crime
prevention, sustainable housing management, social inclusion, welfare, health, education
and improving neighbourhood facilities. Over the next 10 years housing associations will
deliver 8,000 new dwellings in the city, of which 5,000 will be built in urban renewal
areas. In the coming 4 years housing associations and the municipality will each invest
ten million euros extra in social activities. The investment by housing associations is
based on the assumption that the development time of real estate projects will be reduced
by 40%. This is not an ex-ante condition for the investments; the actual efficiency gains
will be assessed by ex-post measurements. Although considered in the development
process, no sanctions are included in the covenant in case of non-compliance. This
arrangement illustrates a certain level of mutual trust in the ability and willingness of
actors to deliver results.
5 Conclusions and further research
In this paper we have presented the network governance approach and used it to take a
closer look at urban regeneration decision-making in Groningen. We saw that policy
development in this area can be a fairly complex venture, mainly because of the inter-
dependencies between actors and the dynamics in the network. The shift from a bricks-and-
mortar approach towards a more balanced approach to urban renewal focusing more on
social investments constituted a major change in the urban regeneration network in
Groningen.
We also showed that this shift towards a more balanced form of urban regeneration turned
an already complex—but still functioning—bricks-and-mortar network into an even more
complex and—for some time—dysfunctional network due to the interconnection with the
social investments network. The Relay Race Model was developed to deliver the efficiency
gains in project development. This instrument alone proved insufficient to bring decision-
making to a successful closure. A very top-down intervention by key officials was necessary.
This intervention resulted in a two-day policy conference that included all relevant issues and
actors, though excluding the residents. This created the opportunity to reach agreement on
the text of the New Urban Regeneration Covenant and create a mechanism to channel
financial resources from project development into social investments.
The research for this article did not include the opinions of residents because they were
not directly involved in the renewal of the Urban Regeneration Covenant. Recent publi-
cations (Van de Wijdeven and De Graaf 2008; Van Hulst et al. 2008) however, have
assessed the involvement of residents in, respectively, the implementation of the new
Covenant and resident participation in the development of Neighbourhood Action Plans for
two priority neighbourhoods in Groningen (named De Hoogte and Korrewegwijk).
The general strategy described in the New Urban Regeneration Covenant has to be
delivered by local teams in the 14 priority neighbourhoods in Groningen. According to the
Covenant, residents should ideally participate in these teams, but this is still an exception
and largely remains a promise to be fulfilled (Van de Wijdeven and De Graaf, 2008). In
addition, the 14 local Neighbourhood Teams take very different approaches, thereby
creating new forms of complexity and uncertainties that need to be overcome.
The pledge by professionals to base their actions on the ‘Confidence in the Neigh-
bourhood’ principles (see Table 1 above) has created high expectations among residents
about their influence on developments in the neighbourhood (Van de Wijdeven and De
Graaf 2008, p. 26).
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As Van de Wijdeven and De Graaf (2008) conclude in their assessment of the decision-
making process, while on a neighbourhood level professionals in Groningen operate as an
intermediary between elected politicians and citizens, the link between the latter two
parties is weak. This is supported by the conclusions of Van Hulst et al. (2008), who state
that the development of Neighbourhood Action Plans for De Hoogte and Korrewegwijk
was dominated by professionals and that the involvement of residents in the development
of the Neighbourhood Action Plans and communication on the outcomes of decision-
making had been limited. The connections between professionals from housing associa-
tions and the municipality appear to be so strong that they tend to exclude to some extent
the local politicians and residents.
Applying the network approach to urban regeneration decision-making in Groningen
increased our understanding of the complexity and the uncertainties involved in these
forms of decision-making. Using the network approach we identified instruments and
strategies used by actors to cope with uncertainties and complexity. Actors in Groningen
developed these tools without explicit knowledge of network concepts.
It remains a topic for further debate and research if a more deliberate use of a network
governance toolbox by practitioners would result in better quality and more efficient
decision-making processes.
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